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Job Search and Unemployment Insurance: 





This paper provides new evidence on job search intensity of the unemployed in the U.S., 
modeling job search intensity as time allocated to job search activities. The main findings 
are: 1) the average unemployed worker in the U.S. devotes about 41 minutes to job search 
on  weekdays,  which  is  substantially  more  than  his  or  her  European  counterpart;  2) 
workers who expect to be recalled by their previous employer search substantially less 
than the average unemployed worker; 3) across the 50 states and D.C., job search is 
inversely related to the generosity of unemployment benefits, with an elasticity between  
-1.6 and -2.2; 4) the predicted wage is a strong predictor of time devoted to job search, 
with  an  elasticity  in  excess  of  2.5;  5)  job  search  intensity  for  those  eligible  for 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) increases prior to benefit exhaustion; 6) time devoted to 
job  search  is  fairly  constant  regardless  of  unemployment  duration  for  those  who  are 
ineligible for UI.  A nonparametric Monte Carlo technique suggests that the relationship 
between job search effort and the duration of unemployment for a cross-section of job 
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1.  Introduction 
It is well known that since the early 1980s the unemployment rate has been lower 
in the U.S. than in Europe.  Our tabulations of international time use data (circa 1998-
2007)  also  indicate  that  unemployed  Americans  tend  to  devote  much  more  time  to 
searching for a new job than their European counterparts (see Figure 1).  On weekdays, 
for example, the average unemployed worker spent 41 minutes a day searching for a job 
in  the  U.S.,  compared  with  just  12  minutes  in  the  average  European  country  with 
available data. One explanation for the comparatively low unemployment rate and high 
search time in the U.S. is the relatively modest level and short duration of Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) benefits in most states.  In this paper we examine the effects of UI on the 
amount of time devoted to job search by unemployed workers in the U.S., using features 
of state UI laws for identification.  
A  large  and  related  literature  examines  the  effects  of  UI  on  the  duration  of 
unemployment spells.  For example, more generous UI benefits have been found to be 
associated  with  longer  spells  of  unemployment,  with  an  elasticity  of  about  1.0  (see 
Krueger  and  Meyer  (2002)  for  a  survey).  In  addition,  the  job  finding  rate  jumps  up 
around the time benefits are exhausted (Moffitt, 1985, Katz and Meyer, 1990a; see Card, 
Chetty and Weber, 2007 for a critical review).  UI is expected to affect the duration of 
unemployment through its effect on the amount of effort devoted to searching for a job 
and the reservation wage of the unemployed, yet these variables have rarely been studied 
directly.
1  We attempt to fill this void by modeling the amount of time that unemployed 
                                                 
1 See Feldstein and Poterba (1984) and Jones (1988) for evidence on self-reported reservation wages and 
unemployment in the U.S. and Great Britain.     3 
individuals devote to searching for a new job over the course of unemployment spells 
using data from the American Time Use Surveys (ATUS) from 2003 to 2007.   
Section  2  summarizes  theoretical  predictions  concerning  search  time  by  the 
unemployed, starting with Mortensen‟s (1977) canonical model of UI and job search.  
Search effort is typically modeled in terms of time, as the opportunity cost of search time 
is  foregone  leisure  (ignoring  hedonic  costs  of  job  search).    Search  time  and  the 
reservation wage are the choice variables that determine the duration of unemployment in 
search models.  Mortensen‟s model yields clear predictions regarding the effects of the 
level and duration of UI benefits on search intensity for UI eligible and ineligible job 
seekers.  We calibrate the Mortensen model and solve it numerically to illustrate the 
effect of the wage offer distribution (mean and variance) on time devoted to job search 
effort.  The amount of time devoted to job search each week is expected to increase as UI 
benefits approach their exhaustion point, and if the mean or variance of the wage offer 
distribution increases; search time is expected to decrease if level or maximum duration 
of UI benefits increases, and workers expecting to be recalled should search less.  We 
empirically test these predictions.   
Section 3 describes the ATUS data and presents summary statistics.  Following 
the theoretical literature, we model the amount of time devoted to job search.  In Section 
4 we estimate the effect on job search of the generosity of UI benefits, job seekers‟ 
predicted  wages,  within-state  residual  wage  dispersion,  recall  expectations  and  other 
variables. Most importantly, we find that job search intensity is inversely related to UI 
benefit  generosity  for  those  who  are  eligible  for  UI,  consistent  with  search  theory.  
Section 5 compares the profile of job search activity by duration of unemployment for 
those eligible or ineligible for UI.  We find a striking contrast in the profiles of job search   4 
activity across those with different durations of unemployment: search activity increases 
as week 26 (benefit exhaustion) approaches for the UI eligible, while the profile is fairly 
flat for those who are ineligible for UI. One econometric issue, however, is that that the 
composition of the sample changes over the duration of unemployment spells, as those 
who search successfully and find a job exit the sample.  To consider the importance of 
this issue for the job search profiles, section 5 also provides a simulation of the effect of 
bias due to length-based sampling on the job search-unemployment profile.   
Section 6 considers the further information that would be required to use our 
estimates to design the optimal UI policy.  Section 7 offers some concluding thoughts as 
to how our results relate to search theory and how time-use data can be used to further 
study UI and job search behavior.   
 
2.  Theoretical considerations 
Mortensen presents a search model with variable search effort and analyzes the 
effects of UI on search effort and, more generally, the escape rate from unemployment. In 
this model, an individual has two choice variables, search effort, st, and the reservation 
wage, wt.  Search effort is modeled as time allocated to job search, as the opportunity cost 
of search is foregone leisure. Given search effort, the arrival rate of job offers is constant 
(st) and the wage is drawn from a known distribution F(w) with upper bound  w .  The 










     

    
w
w
t t w s
t
t t
x dF b h t V x U h s b h t V s b hu
rh




0 , 1 0    (1)   5 
where t is time until benefit exhaustion, h the length of each period, u( ) the flow utility 
for the period, b the unemployment benefit, and U(w) is the value of a job with wage w.  
There is no saving, so consumption equals the wage.   
The first order conditions are:  
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The optimal choice of how much time to spend searching trades off the marginal cost of 
foregone leisure against the increase in the probability of obtaining a job offer (times the 
expected gain from such an offer), and the optimal reservation wage strategy is to accept 
any  wage  offer  that  yields  a  value greater  than  or  equal  to  the  value  of  remaining 
unemployed at the end of the period. 
The Mortensen model predicts that for a newly laid-off worker, search effort is 
decreasing in the maximum benefit duration T and in the benefit level b.
2  Job search 
effort is predicted to increase over the unemployment spell as  benefits are exhausted. 
After benefits are exhausted (t=T), job search effort is predicted to remain constan t. If 
leisure  and consumption are complements ,  search effort jumps up at the moment of 
benefit exhaustion;  if they are substitutes search effort jumps down (see Mortensen, 
1977).  Figure 2a illustrates the effect of benefit generosity on job search over the spell of 
unemployment for a worker initially eligible for 6 months of UI benefits.
3  
For those unemployed who are not eligible for UI or who have exhausted their UI 
benefits, search effort is increasing in the benefit level. This  implication is called the 
                                                 
2 The latter prediction requires the plausible assumption that consumption and leisure are complements.   
3 Figures 2a-2d draw the case where the marginal utility of leisure is independent of consumption (i.e. if 
u12(.)=0).    6 
entitlement effect, as higher benefits raise the value of being unemployed in the future 
and thus raise the value of obtaining a job.
4 An unemployed individual who is ineligible 
for benefits is predicted to devote a constant amount of time to job search because of the 
absence of learning and assumption of stationarity in the Mortensen model .
5  Figure 2b 
contrasts the search time profile of eligible and ineligible workers.   In  actuality, the 
profile for the UI ineligible can lie above or below that of the UI eligible,  depending on 
how their personal characteristics affect their wage offer distributions, but  the profile 
should be flat for the ineligible over the spell of unemployment in Mortensen‟s model.  
Finally, to analyze the predictions of the model with respect to the wage offer 
distribution,  we  solve  the  model  numerically,  assuming  a  log  normal  distribution  of 
wages.
6 An increase in the mean wage offer increases the value of all potential jobs and 
thus increases the return to search.  This is illustrated in Figure 2c.  Figure 2d shows that 
a higher dispersion of potential wage offers, holding the average log wage offer constant, 
also  leads to  higher search effort.  The intuition for this  result  is that, with a higher 
dispersion of potential wages, there is a greater benefit from searching for a high paying 
job, whereas if wage offers are compressed the individual might  as well accept the first 
job offered, as the next is not likely to be much better .
7  Note, however, that this 
conclusion depends on the curvature of the utility function: if workers are extremely risk 
                                                 
4 See Levine (1993) for some evidence on the entitlement effect.   
5 This result also relies on the assumption of  constant worker productivity over a spell of unemployment. 
See, for example, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) for a search model with skill depreciation.  
6 Figures 2a-2d are computed for u(C,L) = log(C) - (1-L)
2, which satisfies the standard assumptions u1, u2 
> 0 and u11, u22 < 0. Note that this formulation of the utility function in leisure L is equivalent to a quadratic 
search cost for the unemployed. We do not allow for on-the-job search (though introducing on-the-job 
search would leave the results qualitatively unchanged).  Potential wage offers  are assumed  to be  log-
normally distributed (approximated with a discrete distribution of 100 points). 
7 See Stigler (1962) for a seminal discussion of how wage dispersion affects the payoff from search effort.     7 
averse, a greater mean-preserving spread in wages might actually lower the expected 
utility gain of getting a job and thus also the time allocated to job search.   
 
Extensions 
Katz (1986) extends the standard search model to allow for the possibility of 
recall to the previous job.
8 He shows that in a model with binary choice of search and 
probability p of recall, the unemployed decide not to search if the probability of recall is 
above a certain threshold. Therefore, we expect that the unemployed with an expectation 
of recall to search less on average.
9,10  
The tax system also has an impact on job search through the after-tax wage offer 
distribution.    Ljungqvist  and  Sargent  (1995)  provide  a  calibrated  model  in  which 
progressive taxation reduces job search effort. The reason is that progressive taxation 
leads to after-tax wage compression, lowering the value of searching for a high paying 
job and thus reducing search effort.   
Allowing for saving, borrowing and liquidity constraints will alter Mortensen‟s 
prediction of a flat job search profile over time for those who are ineligible for benefits.  
In such a model, search intensity would be expected to rise over time as individuals spend 
down their wealth and borrow at rising interest rates.  Nonetheless, eligible UI recipients 
would still be expected to have a search profile that rises faster than that of ineligible job 
seekers until benefits are exhausted. 
                                                 
8 See, also, Feldstein (1976).  
9 Such an observation would also be consistent with Alvarez and Shimer (2008), wh o make a distinction 
between search and rest unemployment. Rest unemployment is defined as a state where an unempl oyed 
worker does not search and waits for local labor market conditions to improve. 
10 See also the empirical work of Katz and Meyer (1990a,b) on recall and job finding hazards.   8 
Stock-flow matching models of the labor market have a different implication for 
the profile of job search by unemployment duration. In this class of models, job search is 
high in the first weeks of an unemployment spell when the unemployed worker screens 
the stock of existing vacancies, but drops thereafter once the entire stock is explored (and 
rises again as the time of benefit exhaustion approaches). See, for example, Coles and 
Smith (1998) for an empirical analysis of such a model.   
 
3.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We  use  data  from  five  consecutive  years  (2003-07)  of  the  ATUS,  which  is 
sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and conducted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  The  ATUS  is  a  nationally  representative  time-use  survey,  which  covers  the 
whole civilian non-institutional population of age 15 and older. The sample is drawn 
from  the  8
th  outgoing  rotation  group  of  the  Current  Population  Survey  (CPS). 
Respondents are interviewed within 2-5 months of their last CPS interview. The ATUS 
collects  detailed  information  on  the  amount  of  time  respondents  devoted  to  various 
activities  in  the  previous  day.  Job  search  activities  include  contacting  a  potential 
employer,  calling  or  visiting  an  employment  agency,  reading  and  replying  to  job 
advertisements, job interviewing, etc.  The Appendix Table provides a detailed list of 
activities that are identified as job search.   
We restrict our sample to the population of age 20-65 to abstract from issues 
related to youth unemployment and retirement. The ATUS labor force recode defines 
unemployment in the same way as the CPS (not working in the reference week, actively 
looking for a job in the 4 weeks prior to the interview, and available for work in the   9 
reference  week).
11  The CPS/ATUS definition of unemployed also includes those on 
temporary layoff with an expectation of rec all to their previous employer, regardless of 
whether they looked for work in the four weeks prior to the survey.  Our sample consists 
of 2,171 unemployed individuals (of which 344 on temporary layoff), 42,934 employed 
individuals, and 11,091 people who are classified as out of the labor force .  Sample 
weights are used in all of our estimates. The sample unemployment rate is 5.2%, which 
exactly matches the official unemployment rate over the same period.   
We can disaggregate the unemployed into four groups: job losers, those expecting 
to be recalled to their previous employer, voluntary job leavers, and re-/new entrants into 
the labor force. The ATUS questionnaire, however,  only contains a question on whether 
the unemployed expect to be recalled.   Thus, we use information from the  final CPS 
interview  to classify  individuals  into the other three groups.  Information on type of 
unemployment from the CPS was used to classify those who were already unemployed at 
the time of their last CPS interview.  Those who became unemployed between the CPS 
and ATUS interview were classified either as  a job loser (if they were employed in the 
CPS) or re-/new entrant (if they were out of the labor force in the CPS). Specifically:  
  Job losers are defined as those on layoff in the CPS, those who report in the CPS that 
their temporary job has ended and those who are employed at the time of the CPS 
interview  (and  subsequently  became  unemployed).  Those  with  an  expectation  of 
recall to their previous employer at the time of the ATUS interview are excluded from 
this category. 
                                                 
11 Note, however, that the reference week is defined as the 7 days prior to the interview (including the diary 
day), as opposed to the week prior to the interview as in the CPS.     10 
  Unemployed on temporary layoff with an expectation of recall are defined as those 
who indicate (in the ATUS interview) that they were given a date to return to work or 
that they expect to be recalled to their previous employer within the next 6 months. 
  Re- or new entrants are defined as those unemployed who indicate that they were re- 
or new entrants in the CPS. Those who are classified as out of the labor force in the 
CPS but as unemployed in the ATUS are also included in this category. 
  Voluntary job leavers are defined as those who indicate that they quit their job. Note 
that  we were  able  to  identify voluntary  job  leavers  only  when they were  already 
unemployed at the time of the CPS interview. 
The Mortensen model has different predictions based on UI eligibility.  Because 
the  ATUS  lacks  information  on  UI  receipt,  we  infer  UI  eligibility  from  the  type  of 
unemployment  and  the  workers‟  full-time/part-time  status  on  the  previous  job.  We 
classify job losers and those on temporary layoff as eligible for UI, and re-entrants, new 
entrants and voluntary job leavers as ineligible.
 In states where those seeking part-time 
jobs  do  not  qualify  for  UI,  we  classify  those  who  previously  worked  part-time  as 
ineligible. 
There is some question as to whether self-reported voluntary job leavers actually 
receive  benefits.  Gruber  (1994)  reports  that  over  20%  of  self-reported  job  leavers 
collected UI benefits. Moreover, Gruber finds that the quitters behave similarly (in terms 
of the consumption response to UI) as those eligible for benefits.  
   11 
Descriptive statistics of job search activities 
Table 1a reports descriptive statistics on the average number of minutes devoted 
to job search by labor force status. It also shows the participation rate in job search, 
defined as the fraction of those with nonzero search time on the diary day. Several results 
are worth highlighting.  First, the unemployed spend around 32 minutes a day (including 
weekends) searching for a job, whereas the employed and those classified as out of the 
labor force devote less than a minute a day to job search, on average.
12 Even if we restrict 
the sample to those who were classified as unemployed in the CPS interview (2-5 months 
prior to the ATUS interview), those classified as out of the labor force in ATUS searched 
for only 4.2 minutes. This suggests that the conventional labor force categories represent 
meaningfully different states.
13  
Second, job search is heavily concentrated on weekdays (see Table 1b). Nearly a 
quarter  of  the  unemployed  engage  in  job  search  activities  on  any  given  weekday, 
compared with 6.7% on weekends. Also, on an average weekday, the unemployed search 
around 41 minutes for a job compared with 9 minutes on an average weekend day. Third, 
those who participate in job search on the diary day tend to devote a great deal of time to 
it. Figure 3 shows a kernel density diagram for the duration of job search conditional on 
searching on the diary day. The average duration of job search among those who searched 
is 167 minutes, and a quarter of job searchers spent more than 240 minutes searching for 
a job on the diary day. Fourth, there are large differences in  job search effort depending 
on the reason for unemployment . Job losers search  32 minutes more (or 3.4 times as 
much) than those who expect to be recalled to their previous job, and around 22 minutes 
                                                 
12 In a companion paper (Krueger and Mueller, 2008) we found similar evidence across 14 countries. 
13 Corroborating evidence from job finding rates is in Flin n and Heckman (1983); see Jones and Riddell 
(1999) for conflicting evidence for Canada.   12 
more (or twice as much) than re- or new entrants. Job leavers also have a high intensity of 
search, devoting almost an hour to job search a day, on average.  Finally, we report 
average minutes of job search by UI eligibility status. Those eligible for UI search 13 
minutes  more  on  an  average  day  than  those  who  are  not  eligible.  This  difference, 
however, falls to 6 minutes when we control for observable characteristics such as age, 
education, sex, marital status, and a dummy for the presence of children. Those eligible 
for UI are generally older, more highly educated, and are more likely to be male as well 
as married (or cohabiting). 
 
Unemployment Insurance 
To qualify for unemployment benefits all states require a worker to have earned a 
certain amount of earnings during a reference period or to have worked for a certain 
period of time. The replacement rate is typically around 50% to 60% of the wage earned 
on the previous job, subject to a maximum benefit. The maximum weekly benefit varies 
widely  across  states,  ranging  from  $210  in  Mississippi  to  $575  in  Massachusetts  in 
2007.
14  Ten states provide dependents allowances beyond the maximum benefit.
15 
In most states, the maximum duration of benefits is 26 weeks, although there are 
some exceptions: Massachusetts (30 weeks), Montana (28 weeks) and  Washington (30 
weeks until 2007).  During 2003, UI recipients were able to receive up to 13 additional 
                                                 
14 According to Krueger and Meyer (2002) around 35% of the unemployed receive the maximum benefit 
amount. 
15 These states are AK, CT, IA, IL, MA, ME, NM, OH, PA and RI.
 The number of dependents usually 
includes children of age 17 and younger, and in some cases the spouse. In Illinois and Maine, the spouse 
counts as a dependent if not working full-time and, therefore, we count a spouse if he or she is not working 
or the reported usual hours are less than 35. In Iowa, the spouse counts as a dependent only if his or her 
weekly gross wage is below 120$, which is about 1/6 of the state average wage, and, in Ohio, if the wage 
does not exceed 25% of the claimant‟s average weekly wage. For this reason, we count the spouse in those 
two states as a dependent if he or she is not working or reports usual hours of 10 or less. In Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania, the spouse counts independent of whether he or she is working.   13 
weeks  of  benefits  through  the  federal  Temporary  Extended  Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 2002, and benefits were extended for 26 weeks in a small number 
of  "high"  unemployment  states.    In  the  period  2004-07,  however,  extended  benefit 
programs  were  in  effect  in  only  a  few  states  and  only  for  limited  periods  of  time 
(affecting less than 0.5% of our sample of unemployed). We exclude observations from 
2003 when we examine job search behavior around 26 weeks of unemployment for the 
UI eligible because of complications caused by the extended benefits program.  
As  described  below,  our  regression  model  exploits  variation  in  the  maximum 
weekly benefit amounts across states and number of dependents. The data for maximum 
weekly benefit amounts is taken from the U.S. Department of Labor‟s Comparison of 
State UI Laws.
16 We take the average of maximum weekly benefit amounts across the 5 
years of the ATUS.  We also take into account dependents‟ allowances.   
 
4.  Job Search Regressions 
To evaluate the predictions of the models outlined in Section 2, we estimated 
micro regressions in which the total amount of time allocated to job search on the diary 
day was the dependent variable and the explanatory variables included the maximum 
weekly UI benefit, the respondent‟s predicted wage, a measure of wage dispersion in the 
state, and personal characteristics.  We proceeded in two steps.  We first estimated the 
predicted wage and residual wage dispersion facing each job seeker, and then used these 
estimates as explanatory variables in the job search equation.  Specifically, the regression 
models we estimated are:  
log(wis) = a + bXi + ds + is  (4) 
                                                 
16 See http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp#Statelaw.   14 
sist =  + 1log(wbaist) + 2  
^
log is w  + 3std(resid. w)s + 1Xi + 2Zi + dt + µist  (5) 
where wis is the hourly wage of worker i in state s, sist is time allocated to job search of 
individual i in state s and time t, wbaist is the maximum weekly benefit amount, Xi is a set 
of controls such as education and sex, which are included in the wage and job search 
equations, Zi is a set of controls exclusively included in the search equation, dt a time 
effect (month and year) and ds a state effect. Zi includes dummies for each group of 
unemployed workers (job loser, on temporary layoff, job leaver and re-/new entrant), 
married  or  cohabiting  with  a  partner,  the  presence  of  children  under  age  18  in  the 
household,  interaction  terms  of  partner  and  children  with  female,  and  a  dummy  for 
whether the diary day was a weekend. The maximum weekly benefit amount varies with 
individual characteristics in the states where dependents allowances are provided beyond 
the maximum weekly benefit of a single earner. Standard errors are robust to correlated 
residuals within states and heteroskedasticity.  
The wage equation was estimated using a sample of 319,813 workers from the 
CPS  outgoing  rotation  group  files  for  2004  and  2005.    We  predicted  each  ATUS 
respondent‟s expected log wage, denoted   
^
log is w , using the coefficients from the wage 
regression  (4).
17    We  computed the standard deviation of residuals from the wage 
equation for each state  (denoted std(resid. w))  as an indicator  of the dispersion in the 
potential wage offer distribution.   
Table 2 reports the results of  estimating equation (5) for four separate samples. 
Column 1 shows the results for the full sample of unemployed  individuals aged 20-65. 
                                                 
17 Data for the wage equation are taken from the CEPR version of the CPS outgoing rotation group files, 
which adjusts for top coding and overtime earnings/tips. We exclude from the sample self-employed and 
self-incorporated, full-time and part-time students and employed with hourly earnings of less than $1 or 
more than $200.     15 
Columns 2-4 report the same regressions for UI eligible and ineligible. In the full sample 
the coefficient on the log of the maximum weekly benefit is negative but not statistically 
significant. The elasticity for the maximum weekly benefit is -1.2 when we restrict the 
sample to those who appear eligible for UI benefits, are not on temporary layoff, and 
have  been  unemployed  for  26  weeks  or  less;  this  is  the  only  sample  for  which  the 
coefficient  on  benefits  is  statistically  significant  at  the  10%  level.    To  gauge  the 
magnitude of this elasticity, consider the effect of changing the WBA from the state with 
the lowest to the highest benefit (for a person without dependents).  Time devoted to job 
search is predicted to decrease by 54 minutes a day.   
For those not eligible for benefits the elasticity is positive but not significant.  A 
test of the equality of the benefit coefficients for those eligible and ineligible for UI 
rejects at the 10 percent level, suggesting a different response to benefit generosity.  In 
column (4) we exclude job leavers from the sample of ineligibles because many of them 
may, in fact, receive UI benefits.  For this sample the benefit coefficient is larger (though 
still insignificantly different from zero),  and the difference between the  eligibles  and 
ineligibles is significant at the 5 percent level.  Consistent with Gruber, in results not 
shown here we find that UI benefits are negatively and significantly associated with job 
search time for the subsample of job leavers, suggesting that many receive UI benefits.   
We also estimated Tobit models for the same four samples to account for the mass 
of workers with 0 minutes of job search on the diary day. Table 3 reports estimated 
coefficients of the Tobit model as well as an adjustment factor that allows one to compute 
the marginal effect of each variable. The marginal effect of a Tobit model is dE(y|x)/dxi =  
i * (x/) where (.) is the standard normal cdf and, to make the Tobit estimates   16 
comparable to the linear regression models, we evaluate the adjustment factor at the mean 
values of x ( ) ˆ / ˆ (   x  ).
18  In the full sample, the coefficient on benefits is positive and 
not significant  at conventional levels. In the subsample of eligible  unemployed with 
spells of 26 weeks or less, the coefficient on benefits is significant at the 5% level and the 
implied elasticity is -0.8.  Again, the contrast between the benefit effect for those eligible 
and ineligible for benefits is statistically significant.   
Note that the reported elasticities are all  calculated with respect to the legislated 
maximum weekly benefit amount.  To estimate the elasticity of job search with respect to 
actual UI benefits, we estimate d a linear and a Tobit model with the log of the state 
average weekly benefit in place of the maximum weekly benefit.
19 We instrument for the 
actual average benefit  with the log maximum weekly benefit. The maximum weekly 
benefit is a strong instrument for average benefits: the coefficient on the maximum 
weekly benefit in the first stage is 0.54 with a t-ratio of 11.3. Table 4 reports the marginal 
effects of the log average weekly benefits. Taking the IV estimates from column  2, the 
implied elasticity is -2.2 for the linear model and around -1.6 for the Tobit model.   
To put these estimates in perspective, we can calculate the differential search time 
between the U.S. and the European countries shown in Figure 1 that is predicted by the 
difference in benefit generosity   and the benefit coefficients .  Based on Krueger a nd 
Mueller (2008), benefits are 0.114 log points lower in the U.S. over the first 26 weeks of 
a spell of unemployment.  The  IV-Tobit  estimate  in column 2 of Table 4  therefore 
implies that job search time would be  9 minutes longer in the U.S., and the  Two-Stage 
                                                 
18 Note that the effect of dummy variables is different because of the non-linear nature of the Tobit model. 
19 The state average weekly benefit is defined as benefits paid for total unemployment divided by weeks 
compensated for total unemployment.  We take the average of the state average weekly b enefit over the 
years 2003-07 from http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/data.asp.    17 
Least Squares model predicts that it would be 13 minutes longer.  American job seekers 
search about 29 minutes more per weekday than European job seekers.  The lower benefit 
levels  in  the  U.S.  could  therefore  account  for  from  30  percent  to  43  percent  of  the 
difference in search time.  Although there are some obvious limitations of this calculation 
– such as the fact that we were not able to restrict the European sample to UI recipients – 
the results suggest that UI benefit generosity can potentially explain a nontrivial share of 
the difference in search behavior of the unemployed in the U.S. and Europe.  
The  results  in  Tables  2  and  3  also  show  that  unemployed  workers  with  an 
expectation  of  recall  search  significantly  less  than  job  losers,  consistent  with  Katz‟s 
(1986) prediction. Indeed, other things equal, those with an expectation of recall hardly 
search at all.   
The  fitted  wage  is  a  strong  predictor  of  job  search.  In  the  full  sample  the 
coefficient is significant at the 5% level in the linear model and at the 1% level in the 
Tobit model. The point estimate of the elasticity at the mean is 3.4 in the linear model and 
2.6 in the Tobit model.  The estimate from the linear model implies that moving from the 
state with the lowest to the highest average log wage is associated with a 46 minute 
increase in time devoted to job search.  Note that we control for all the variables of the 
wage equation (age, sex and education) in the search models in Tables 2 and 3, except for 
state dummies. If we exclude these variables from the search regressions, the elasticity of 
the wage is much lower (around 1), which suggests that inter-state wage differentials are 
a much stronger determinant of time allocated to job search than are wage differences 
associated with personal characteristics.  
The residual wage dispersion term is insignificant but usually positive in most of 
the OLS and Tobit models.  This is a contrast to Krueger and Mueller‟s (2008) cross-  18 
country  study,  which  found  that  job  search  is  higher  in  countries  with  higher  wage 
dispersion, controlling for benefits and other factors. One reason might be that residual 
wage  dispersion  is  lower  across  the  U.S.  states  than  across  countries,  and  therefore 
conveys less signal than in the cross-country data.  The standard deviation of the 90-10 
wage ratio is 0.41 in our CPS sample compared with 0.81 in our cross-country sample. It 
is also worth noting that if we measure wage dispersion by the standard deviation of the 
exponential  of  the  residual  from  equation  (4),  the  coefficient  on  wage  dispersion  is 
positive  and  statistically  significant  (t-ratio  of  1.90)  in  the  full  sample.  Thus,  the 
empirical effect of wage variability on search intensity is sensitive to functional form.  
In results not presented here, we tested the robustness of the findings in Tables 2 
and 3 by including the state-level unemployment rate, which had a negative coefficient 
but  was  not  statistically  significant.
20  If  we  add  an  interaction  between   the 
unemployment rate and the log weekly benefit, however, we find that the main effect of 
the unemployment rate becomes negative and significant at the 10 percent level, while 
the interaction is positive and also significant at the 10 percent level.  Because of concern 
about simultaneous causation – a high unemployment rate could cause fewer people to 
search for a job and could be caused by low job search intensity  – we excluded the 
unemployment rate and its interaction with benefits from the models in Tables 2 and 3.  
We also excluded the duration of unemployment because it is endogenously determined 
with search time.  It is nonetheless reassuring that none of the variables of interest had a 
qualitatively different effect if these variables were included.   
Overall, the regression results provide support for Mortensen‟s (1977) model to 
varying  degrees.  Differences  across  states  in  the  level  of  benefits  have  a  negative 
                                                 
20 See Shimer (2004) for an analysis of how search intensity varies with the business cycle.     19 
relationship  with  job  search  in  the  subsample  of  UI  eligible  job  seekers  with 
unemployment duration of 26 weeks or less. Also, for the UI ineligible, the effect of 
benefits on job search is predicted to be positive (the entitlement effect). The coefficient 
has the expected sign but is not significant. However, we can reject at the 10% level the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient on maximum weekly  benefits is equal for the UI 
eligible and ineligible (i.e., contrasting the coefficients on benefits in columns 2 and 3 in 
Table 2 or 3). Finally, our results suggest that a job seeker‟s predicted wage and recall 
expectation  have  strong  effects  on  job  search  activity,  but  we  find  mixed  results  for 
residual wage dispersion, probably due to lower variability across states.   
 
5.  Job Search and Unemployment Spell Duration 
The standard search model makes strong predictions regarding the amount of time 
spent searching for a job by duration of unemployment. In particular, for those eligible 
for benefits, job search intensity should increase as benefits approach the exhaustion date. 
By  contrast,  search  intensity  by  the  ineligible  should  remain  constant  throughout  the 
unemployment spell. Although it would be preferable to examine these relationships with 
longitudinal data that track search intensity for the same individuals over the course of 
their unemployment spells, we can use ATUS data to examine the cross-sectional patterns 
of job search across those with different durations of unemployment at the time of the 
survey.   
To nonparametrically estimate the unemployment duration-job search profile we 
utilize LOWESS to plot the fitted values of a locally weighted regression of minutes   20 
spent in job search on unemployment duration at the time of the ATUS.
21  We exclude 
those  who have an expectation of recall to their previous employer, as their  search 
behavior is different and affected by the recall strategy of the employer.  
Unfortunately,  t he  ATUS  interview  does  not  collect  information  on 
unemployment duration.  Consequently, we derive unemployment duration by taking the 
unemployment duration  reported in the last CPS interview  and adding the number of 
weeks  that elapsed  between the  CPS  interview  and the ATUS interview .    Eighty-six 
percent of the  ATUS interviews were  conducted  within 3  months  of  the last CPS 
interview.  For those who were not unemployed  at the time of the CPS interview, we 
impute duration of unemployment by taking half the number of weeks between the CPS 
and the ATUS interviews.  We do not show the  weekly LOWESS plot for 13 weeks or 
less, but simply report the average time allocated to search, as the imputed unemployment 
duration  are  quite  noisy  for  those  who  become  un employed  after  their  last  CPS 
interview.
22    
Figure 4 shows the LOWESS plot separately for those eligible and ineligible for 
UI benefits.
23  The unemployment duration-search profile for the  UI ineligible group is 
fairly flat, consistent with  standard  search  models. For the UI eligible , however,  job 
                                                 
21 More precisely, LOWESS carries out a linear weighted regression for each week of unemployment 
duration including the nearest neighbor subset of observations, where weights decline with the distance to 
the center of the regression. This subset is of size 0.1 (the bandwidth) times the size of the sample. 
Note that STATA does not allow the use of survey weights for LOWESS. For this reason, we duplicate 
each  observation  x  number  of  times  where  x  corresponds  to  the  survey  weight  (with  the  “expand” 
command in STATA). This generates a dataset representative of the population and we  carry out our 
LOWESS in this expanded version of the dataset. 
22 About one third of our sample of unemployed individuals (excluding those on temporary layoff) has an 
unemployment duration of 14 weeks or more.  
23  Note that we exclude observations on eligible individuals from 2003 because the federal extended 
benefits program was in effect that year.    21 
search increases sharply between week 15 and 26 of unemployment, from less than 20 
minutes to greater than 70 minutes, and then falls back to around 25 minutes.   
We probed the robustness of the profiles in Figure 4 by removing the effects of 
age, sex, and other characteristics (i.e., the explanatory variables in column 1 of Table 2), 
and then used the residuals in the LOWESS analysis.  Figure 5 provides LOWESS plots 
of the residuals. The general patterns in the duration-search profiles are fairly similar to 
those in Figure 4, although the increase in time devoted to job search between week 15 
and 26 for the UI eligible sample is somewhat smaller after removing the effects of the 
explanatory variables.  
The increase in job search in the weeks prior to benefit exhaustion for the UI 
eligible sample and the fairly constant amount of time devoted to job search for the UI 
ineligible  are  both  consistent  with  Mortensen‟s  (1977)  search  model.    However,  the 
decline in job search after week 26 is unexpected, as the model predicts that workers 
allocate a constant amount of time to job search after benefits are exhausted.  We next 
explore one possible explanation for the decline in search activity after week 26.   
 
5.1  Possible Bias Due to Length-Based Sampling 
There  is  a  potential  selection  issue  due  to  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  the 
propensity to search for a job:  job seekers who devote a lot of effort to searching for a 
job are more likely to find one and exit the sample, whereas those with a low proclivity to 
search remain in the sample.  This creates a possible “length-based sampling” bias that 
would  tend  to  cause  the  search  profiles  to  slope  down  with  unemployment  duration.  
(Notice, however, that the bias could go in the opposite direction if people who search 
very little become discouraged and leave the labor force.)     22 
The fact that the relationship between spell duration and job search is fairly flat 
profile for the UI ineligible sample is an indication that bias due to length-based sampling 
is probably small, as this group would also be subject to length-based sample bias if 
workers have heterogeneous commitments to job search.  To quantitatively assess the 
potential bias from length-based sampling, we performed nonparametric Monte Carlo 
simulations  of  selection  out  of  unemployment.  These  calculations  are  meant  to  be 
illustrative. To proceed, we estimated a job search “production function” of the following 
form: 
Pi = a + b*Si  (6) 
where Pi is the probability of transitioning from unemployment to work in a given week 
for individual i and Si is the time allocated to job search. As explained below, we estimate 
„b‟ from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79).  We obtain the intercept 
„a‟ by matching the fraction of survivors in week 39 in our simulations to the fraction of 
survivors in week 39 in ATUS (around 32%).  
Given estimates of „a‟ and „b‟, we start with the pool of unemployed individuals 
in ATUS with a short duration of unemployment, defined as less than 13 weeks, as the 
base  group  for  our  simulation.    These  individuals  can  be  thought  of  as  virtually 
unaffected by length-based sampling because they have had relatively little time to exit 
the sample.  We assume that each job seeker‟s daily job search time is fixed (i.e., the 
same as in this initial period regardless of how many weeks they subsequently search for 
a job) to exclusively reflect the effect of individual heterogeneity.  Our goal is to simulate 
the relationship between job search time and the duration of unemployment from week 13 
to week 39 that can be attributed solely to length-based sampling.  We use the job finding 
production function and initial search times to simulate the job finding rate each week   23 
and the average search time for those who remain unemployed each week.  The profile 
that emerges is purely the result of length-based sampling under these assumptions.   
  More specifically, we use the following algorithm: 
 
1.  Set d = 13 for all of the unemployed in our base group, where d represents the number 
of weeks of unemployment so far. 
 
2.  Draw  a  random  number  e  from  the  uniform  distribution  (0,1)  for  each  simulated 
worker with a spell that has lasted to week d.  If  e < Pi = a + b*Si, we assume 
unemployed worker finds a job and exits the sample in that week. If e >=  Pi , the 
unemployed worker does not find a job and remains unemployed.   
 
3.  Reset d = d + 1 and, for those remaining in the sample, we compute the average 
search time. Repeat steps (2) and (3) until d=39.   
 
4.  Iterate (1)-(4) 50 times and then take the average of the simulated data.   
 
5.2  Estimation of the linear job search technology 
It is not possible to examine the relationship between the amount of time spent 
searching for a job and the likelihood of finding a job in the ATUS.  Consequently, we 
use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to estimate the 
parameter  „b‟  in  the  linear  job  search  technology.
24    Specifically, we use the 1981 
supplemental questions on job search, which  asked how much time job searchers  spent 
looking for a job in the  seven days prior to the interview and what kind of job search 
methods they used in their current unemployment spell (e.g. , asking friends, placing or 
answering ads, direct contacts with employers and using state or private empl oyment 
services).
25 We restrict the NLSY sample to unemployed  individuals age 18-24.  The 
sample size is 1,162. 
                                                 
24 Holzer (1987) uses the same data set to compare job search of the employed and unemployed.   
25 The reported average search time per week is 238 minutes, or 34 minutes a day, which is similar to our 
results in the ATUS.   24 
We model the likelihood that an unemployed worker accepts a job with a linear 
probability model. The dependent variable equals 1 if the unemployed worker has found 
a job and 0 if she or he has not. We regress this indicator variable on the number of 
minutes spent searching for a job in the seven days prior to the interview, controlling for 
age, sex and years of education. As Table 5 reports, the estimated coefficient is small: 
increasing  search  by  one  hour  increases  the  probability  of  finding  a  job  by  0.31 
percentage points. We suspect, however, that our model specification does not capture the 
full effect of search effort on the probability of finding a job because of the impact of 
time lags between search effort and job finding. For this reason, we instrument for the 
number of minutes searched in the last seven days with the total number of job search 
methods used in the current unemployment spell. Our hope is that this approach captures 
the full effect of search time on job finding because the number of methods used is more 
closely associated with past search effort.    
Column 3 in Table 5 indicates that the number of job search methods is a strong 
instrument for minutes of job search.  The coefficient is significant at the 1% level with a 
t-ratio of 5.59.  The results of the second-stage regression indicate that the estimated 
coefficient on minutes of job search is much larger than in the baseline OLS regression: 
increasing search by one hour raises the probability of finding a job by 1.83 percentage 
points.  To  obtain  the  slope  coefficient  „b‟  used  in  the  simulation  of  length  based 
sampling, we divide this estimate (and the OLS estimate) by seven to adjust for the fact 
that in ATUS we observe time allocated to job search only on one day of the week.   
We can compare our estimates to Paserman (2007) who uses the NLSY79 to 
estimate how time spent on job search relates to the probability of receiving a job offer 
for different methods of job search. More precisely, he assumes that the probability of   25 
receiving a job offer takes the form Pij = 1 – (1+Sij)
-j where j is the method of job search 
used by individual i, and then uses maximum likelihood techniques to estimate j. To 
make his estimates comparable to ours, we evaluate the marginal effect of hours spent on 
job search, dPj/dSj = j(1+Sj)
-j-1, at the average Sj. The marginal effects are closer to our 
OLS estimate than our IV estimate: dPj/dSj is lowest for “newspaper ads” (0.54%) and 
largest for “other methods” (1.36%).
26 The similarity is reassuring and our higher IV 
estimates  are  to  be  expected  as  we  try  to  account  for  differences  in  past  job  search 
behavior by instrumenting for time spent searching last week by the number of job search 
methods used during the entire unemployment spell. 
 
5.3  Simulation Results 
Figure  6  plots  the  fraction  of  survivors  by  week  of  unemployment  spell.  A 
survivor is defined as an unemployed individual who has not found a job yet. Only 32% 
of those unemployed in week 13 “survive” until week 39. This suggests that  sample 
selection could be an important issue.  Yet the results in Figure 7 show that despite the 
large number of those who find a job between week 13 and 39, length based sampling is 
predicted  to  impart  a  relatively  minor  bias  on  average  search  time.  The  decrease  in 
average  search  time  due  to  our  rather  extreme  assumptions  about  the  length-based-
sampling process is only about 8 minutes between week 13 and 39.    If we use the OLS 
estimate  of  the  effect  of  search  time  on  job  finding  instead  of  the  IV  estimate  the 
predicted bias is even smaller, only around 1 minute.   
                                                 
26 Note that we use a different dependent variable (“accepted job”) than Paserman (“received job offer”).  
Because job seekers in the NLYS79 accept only around half of the job offers they receive, we divide the 
marginal effects by two when comparing his estimates to ours.    26 
These simulations are meant to be illustrative, but they suggest the difficulty of 
explaining the general profiles in Figure 4 with reference to bias due to length-based 
sampling.  Length-based sampling seems particularly unlikely to account for the large 
drop in average search time after week 26 for the eligible UI sample in Figure 4, or for 
the run up in search time prior to week 26, as the bias is likely to be monotonically 
increasing over spell durations and small.   
 
6.  Moral hazard versus liquidity effects of UI 
  What  are  the  implications  of  our  estimates  for  the  optimal  unemployment 
insurance policy? One way to interpret our findings regarding the effects of UI benefit 
generosity and maximum duration on time devoted to job search is as a “moral hazard” 
effect: UI indirectly subsidizes leisure while unemployed and thus reduces the incentives 
to search for a new job and return to work.  However, in the presence of borrowing 
constraints and, more generally, in the absence of insurance markets for unemployment 
risk, UI also enables job seekers to smooth consumption and thus reduces the pressure for 
them to rush back to work.  Chetty (2008) shows that the effect of a one-period increase 
in benefits can be decomposed into a liquidity effect and moral hazard effect: 
 
dst/dbt = dst/dAt – dst/dwt  (7) 
 
where dst/dAt is the marginal change in search effort in response to a one dollar increase 
in cash on hand (the liquidity effect) and (–dst/dwt) is the marginal change in search effort 
in response to a one dollar increase in the wage in period t (the moral hazard effect). He 
argues  that  the  optimal  level  of  unemployment  benefits  depends  on  the  relative   27 
importance of these two effects.  If dst/dAt is close to zero, agents reveal that they wish 
not to rush back to work and thus the moral hazard effect prevails, but if dst/dAt is large, 
the liquidity effect is important and potentially outweighs the disincentive effect of UI. 
  To evaluate the importance of liquidity effects we follow Chetty (2008) and split 
the  sample  of  UI  eligible  job  seekers  into  those  with  a  working  partner  (married  or 
unmarried) and those without. Those with access to a secondary income source are more 
likely to maintain consumption during a spell of unemployment and thus should be less 
responsive  to  unemployment  benefits.  We  find  support  for  this  hypothesis  as  the 
coefficient  on  benefits  for  those  with  a  working  partner  is  positive  and  statistically 
insignificant  whereas  the  elasticity  for  those  without  a  working  partner  is  -2.1  and 
significant at the 5% level (t-ratio 2.02). Moreover, the difference between the benefit 
coefficients in the two samples is statistically significant at the 10% level (t-ratio 1.98). 
We also split the UI eligible sample into those with annual household income 
below  and  above  $25,000.  Note,  however,  that  it  is  unclear  whether  higher  income 
households  have  greater  ability  to  borrow.  Chetty  (2008)  finds  that  higher  income 
households are more likely to be paying off mortgages. Nevertheless, the unemployed 
with low annual household income are more responsive to benefits with an elasticity of    
-2.7 (t-ratio 1.78) compared to -0.8 (t-ratio 1.29) for those with household income higher 
than $25,000, but the difference is not statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Although  not  definitive,  these  results  suggest  that  liquidity  constraints  have  a 
potentially important impact on many job seekers, as the search intensity of those who 
have less access to financial resources appears to respond more strongly to UI benefits. 
To conduct a proper welfare analysis, however, we would like to estimate the elasticity of 
job search with respect to marginal increases in cash on hand, such as, for example, due   28 
to severance payments. Unfortunately, there is no such information currently available in 
the ATUS.  Future research with time-use data might be able to distinguish the liquidity 
effect from the moral hazard effect.   
 
7.  Summary and Conclusion  
This paper provides new evidence on job search intensity and Unemployment 
Insurance.  We  use  data  from  the  American  Time  Use  Survey  and  model  job  search 
intensity as time allocated to job search activities, consistent with theoretical models. We 
find that time allocated to job search is inversely related to the maximum weekly benefit 
amount for UI eligible workers, with an elasticity of -1.6 to -2.2, which is large enough to 
account for much of the gap in job search time between the U.S. and Europe.  We also 
find that job search increases sharply in the weeks prior to benefit exhaustion, in line with 
Mortensen‟s (1977) model.  These findings highlight the utility of simple search models 
for understanding job search behavior and UI.   
A finding that is inconsistent with Mortensen‟s (1977) search model, however, is 
that search effort appears to decline after week 26, when benefits run out, rather than 
remain constant.  This finding deserves further attention.  One possible explanation is that 
the  unemployed  become  discouraged  if  they  fail  to  find  a  job  despite  substantially 
increasing their search effort before UI benefits run out at 26 weeks, and consequently 
stop searching.  A related explanation is that the unemployed may feel that they have 
explored all of their  plausible  job  opportunities  after  they sharply  raised  their search 
effort in the weeks leading up to the exhaustion of their UI benefits, and rationally feel 
they have little to gain from maintaining the same level of search effort over the next few 
months.     29 
Another finding is that each job seeker‟s fitted wage is a strong predictor of the 
amount  of  time  he  or  she  allocates  to  job  search.  Because  we  control  for  the  same 
demographic variables in the search and wage equations, this finding suggests that wage 
premia  associated  with  state  of  residence  provide  incentives  for  job  search.  Higher 
residual wage dispersion in a state, however, has an insignificant though usually positive 
association with job search in our base specification. It is unclear why we found that 
wage  dispersion  at  the  country  level  is  significantly  related  to  job  search  activity  in 
Krueger and Mueller (2008) but is insignificant when cross-state variability is used for 
the U.S., although the lower wage dispersion across states than countries poses a greater 
challenge for estimation in the present paper.  Lastly, we find that job seekers who likely 
have less access to financial resources (e.g., because they do not have a working spouse) 
tend to respond more to UI benefits than do those with greater financial wherewithal, 
consistent with a role for liquidity constraints.   
Our findings suggest that time-use data offer a fruitful approach for research on 
job search intensity. In particular, if future ATUS surveys collect data on unemployment 
duration, one could further investigate the link between unemployment duration and job 
search, and test the predictions of other search models, e.g., stock-flow matching models, 
which predict a U-shaped unemployment duration-search profile.  Longitudinal time-use 
data would help to control for length-based sampling and individual heterogeneity in job 
search  activity.  Moreover,  data  on  severance  payments  and  asset  positions  of  the 
unemployed could allow one to determine the relative importance of moral hazard and 
liquidity effects of unemployment benefits. 
   30 
References 
Alvarez, Fernando and Robert Shimer. 2008. “Search and Rest Unemployment.” NBER 
Working Paper No. 13772, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Card, David, Raj Chetty and Andrea Weber. 2007.  “The Spike at Benefit Exhaustion: 
Leaving  the  Unemployment  System  or  Starting  a  New  Job?”    American  Economic 
Review: Papers and Proceedings 97 (2): 113-8.   
 
Chetty,  Raj.  2008.  “Moral  Hazard  versus  Liquidity  and  Optimal  Unemployment 
Insurance.” Journal of Political Economy 116(2): 173-234. 
 
Coles,  Melvyn  and  Eric  Smith.  1998.  “Marketplaces  and  Matching.”  International 
Economic Review 39(1): 239-254.  
 
Feldstein, Martin.  1976.  “Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment.”  The 
Journal of Political Economy 84(5): 937-957. 
 
Feldstein, Martin and  James Poterba. 1984. "Unemployment insurance and reservation 
wages." Journal of Public Economics 23(1-2): 141-67.  
 
Flinn, Christopher and James Heckman. 1983. “Are unemployment and out of the labor 
force behaviorally distinct states?” Journal of Labor Economics 1(1): 28-42. 
Gruber,  Jonathan.  1994.  “The  Consumption  Smoothing  Benefits  of  Unemployment 
Insurance.” NBER Working Paper No. 4750, Cambridge, MA.  
Holzer, Harry. 1987. “Job Search by Employed and Unemployed Youth.” Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 40(4): 601-611. 
 
Jones,  Stephen.  1988.    “The  Relationship  Between  Unemployment  Spells  and 
Reservation Wages as a Test of Search Theory.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
103 (4): 741-65.    
 
Jones, Stephen and W. Craig Riddell.  1999.  “The Measurement of Unemployment: An 
Empirical Approach.” Econometrica 67 (1): 147-61.   
 
Katz, Lawrence. 1986. “Layoffs,  Recall and the Duration of Unemployment”.  NBER 
Working Paper No. 1825, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Katz,  Lawrence  and  Bruce  Meyer.  1990a.  “The  impact  of  the  potential  duration  of 
unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment.” Journal of Public Economics 
41(1): 45-72. 
   31 
Katz,  Lawrence  and  Bruce  Meyer.  1990b.  “Unemployment  Insurance,  Recall 
Expectations, And Unemployment Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105(4): 
973-1002. 
 
Krueger, Alan and Bruce Meyer. 2002. “Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance.” In: 
Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (editors), Handbook of Public Economics Vol 4. 
North-Holland: Amsterdam. 
 
Krueger, Alan and Andreas Mueller. 2008. “The Lot of the Unemployed: A Time Use 
Perspective.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 3490, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 
Bonn, Germany.  
 
Levine,  Phillip.  1993.  “Spillover  Effects  Between  the  Insured  and  Uninsured 
Unemployed.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47(1): 73-86.   
 
Ljungqvist,  Lars  and  Thomas  Sargent.  1995.  “Welfare  States  and  Unemployment.” 
Economic Theory 6(1): 143-160. 
 
Ljungqvist, Lars and Thomas Sargent. 1998. “The European Unemployment Dilemma.” 
The Journal of Political Economy 106(3): 514-550.   
 
Moffitt, Robert. 1985. “Unemployment Insurance and the Distribution of Unemployment 
Spells.” Journal of Econometrics, 28(1): 85–101. 
 
Mortensen, Dale. 1977. “Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions.” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 30(4): 505-517. 
 
Paserman, Daniele. 2007. “Job Search and Hyperbolic Discounting: Structural Estimation 
and Policy Evaluation.” Forthcoming, Economic Journal. 
 
Shimer, Robert.  2004.  “Search Intensity.” mimeo., University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.  
 
Stigler, George. 1962.  “Information in the Labor Market.” Journal of Political Economy 





Appendix Table. Definition and examples of job search activities in ATUS 2006 
 
Job search activities (050401), e.g.: 
contacting employer 
making phone calls to prospective employer 
sending out resumes 
asking former employers to provide references 
auditioning for acting role (non-volunteer) 
auditioning for band/symphony (non-volunteer) 
placing/answering ads 
researching details about a job 
filling out job application 
asking about job openings 
reading ads in paper/on Internet 
checking vacancies 
researching an employer 
submitting applications 
writing/updating resume 
meeting with headhunter/temp agency 
picking up job application 
 
Interviewing (050403), e.g.: 
interviewing by phone or in person 
scheduling/canceling interview (for self) 
preparing for interview 
 
Other activities related to job search, e.g.: 
waiting associated with job search interview (050404) 
security procedures rel. to job search/interviewing (050405) 
travel related to job search (180504) 
job search activities, not elsewhere specified (050499) 
 
 
   33 
 
 
Figure 1. Average number of minutes devoted to job search per day on weekdays by unemployed 
workers in various countries 
 
 





Notes: The model is solved numerically for the following parameter values: h=1 month, T=6 months, r = 0.0041,  (job 
separation rate) = 0.05,  = 15,  = 1150, b = 0.5, b2 (consumption of unemployed after benefit exhaustion) = 0.1.  is 
calibrated to match a monthly job offer rate of approximately 0.5 for a newly-laid off;  is calibrated such that time spent on 
job search matches time spent on job search in ATUS (as a fraction of total non-sleeping time available per week). 
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Table 1a. Descriptive statistics ATUS 2003 - 2007, by labor force status 
   # respondents  % of total 
Average job 
search, in min 
Participation 





           
By labor force status                
Employed  42,934  76.4%  0.6  0.6%  101.0 
Unemployed  2,171  3.9%  32.1  19.3%  166.9 
Not in labor force  11,091  19.7%  0.8  0.5%  152.9 
           
By type of employed  (% of employed)     
Working in CPS  40,576  94.5%  0.5  0.5%  107.6 
Unemployed in CPS  824  1.9%  2.8  2.5%  115.4 
Not in labor force in CPS  1,534  3.6%  0.8  1.7%  49.7 
           
By type of unemployed  (% of unemployed)     
Jobloser  943  43.4%  45.2  27.5%  164.2 
On temporary layoff 
w/ recall expectation  344  15.8%  13.2  7.1%  185.8 
Jobleaver  65  3.0%  52.9  24.9%  212.3 
Re- or new entrant  819  37.7%  23.1  14.1%  163.6 
           
By UI eligibility status  (% of unemployed)     
UI ineligible  1,000  46.1%  25.4  15.6%  163.4 
UI eligible  1,171  53.9%  38.0  22.5%  169.1 
           
By type of "not in labor force"  (% of not in labor force)     
Working in CPS  1,181  10.6%  2.4  1.8%  134.1 
Unemployed in CPS  305  2.7%  4.2  3.2%  130.8 
Not in labor force in CPS  9,605  86.6%  0.5  0.3%  176.7 
Notes: Averages and participation rates are computed with survey weights. Universe: Civilian, noninstitutional population, age 20-65. 





Table 1b. Descriptive statistics ATUS 2003 - 2007, by labor force status (weekdays only) 
   # respondents  % of total 
Average job 
search, in min 
Participation 





           
By labor force status                
Employed  21,291  76.4%  0.7  0.7%  99.7 
Unemployed  1,076  3.9%  41.1  24.1%  170.8 
Not in labor force  5,495  19.7%  1.1  0.7%  159.8 
           
By type of employed  (% of employed)     
Working in CPS  20,141  94.6%  0.6  0.6%  106.0 
Unemployed in CPS  395  1.9%  3.7  3.0%  123.3 
Not in labor force in CPS  755  3.5%  0.8  1.9%  40.8 
           
By type of unemployed  (% of unemployed)     
Jobloser  488  45.4%  56.2  33.6%  167.0 
On temporary layoff 
w/ recall expectation  171  15.9%  16.7  8.9%  188.9 
Jobleaver  25  2.3%  69.6  33.7%  206.4 
Re- or new entrant  392  36.4%  30.5  17.8%  171.3 
           
By UI eligibility status  (% of unemployed)       
UI ineligible  473  44.0%  33.2  19.6%  169.5 
UI eligible  603  56.0%  47.9  27.9%  171.5 
           
By type of "not in labor force"  (% of not in labor force)     
Working in CPS  572  10.4%  3.5  2.4%  143.6 
Unemployed in CPS  159  2.9%  5.6  4.1%  136.6 
Not in labor force in CPS  4,764  86.7%  0.7  0.4%  181.4 
Notes: Averages and participation rates are computed with survey weights. Universe: Civilian, noninstitutional population, age 20-65.   40 
Table 2. Results of linear regressions for job search time     
Dependent variable: time allocated to job 
search, in min 
Mean 
(Std)  Full sample (1) 
Subsample (2): eligible 
w/o recall expectation 







Wage equation - 
dependent variable: 
log(hourly wage) 
Mean of dependent variable     32.1  49.1  25.4  23.8    2.76 
Log(maximum weekly benefit amount)  5.89  -6.86  -57.275  10.096  20.323     
  (0.220)  (11.971)  (30.663)*  (19.864)  (19.864)     
Fitted log(hourly wage)  2.60  110.066  174.048  105.099  74.456     
  (0.329)  (48.715)**  (120.772)  (64.247)  (66.168)     
Std(residual of wage equation) - by state  0.490  92.868  274.379  83.161  103.72     
  (0.023)  (101.732)  (196.089)  (111.950)  (106.049)     
On temporary layoff w/ recall expectation (1)  0.15  -32.884    -11.497  -11.543     
    (4.973)***    (12.479)  (12.951)     
Jobleaver  0.03  12.876    21.507       
    (16.585)    (20.857)       
Re- or new entrant  0.38  -13.656    -3.456  -3.666     
    (5.280)**    (10.363)  (10.524)     
Age  36.75  -5.12  -6.816  -5.605  -4.304    0.061 
    (3.198)  (7.966)  (3.691)  (3.766)    (0.001)*** 
Age^2    0.053  0.078  0.052  0.039    -0.001 
    (0.034)  (0.086)  (0.039)  (0.040)    (0.000)*** 
Some college or associate degree (2)  0.29  -13.133  -16.282  -14.284  -12.492    0.209 
    (12.991)  (32.615)  (14.991)  (16.152)    (0.002)*** 
College degree (BA, MA or PhD)  0.16  -46.877  -59.764  -68.348  -49.961    0.573 
    (28.113)  (72.634)  (37.407)*  (38.884)    (0.003)*** 
Female  0.51  14.021  52.805  -6.649  -14.652    -0.231 
    (13.543)  (33.296)  (16.080)  (15.793)    (0.002)*** 
Female*partner  0.28  -11.09  -34.334  9.703  10.677     
    (8.400)  (16.167)**  (17.016)  (17.870)     
Female*children  0.30  -7.925  -26.06  6.872  9.04     
    (14.362)  (26.744)  (17.905)  (17.764)     
Partner  0.50  0.176  7.652  -11.682  -12.317     
    (8.911)  (13.632)  (18.347)  (18.984)     
Children  0.49  7.113  39.751  -14.717  -16.346     
    (12.786)  (18.914)**  (17.389)  (17.669)     
Weekend  0.28  -30.883  -53.138  -21.693  -20.711     
    (3.797)***  (6.492)***  (4.676)***  (4.607)***     
Constant    -115.341  -71.375  -169.555  -189.458    1.2 
    (66.062)*  (128.577)  (100.181)*  (101.539)*    (0.013)*** 
Year and month dummies     x  x  x  x    Year dummy 
State dummies                   x 
Observations    2,171  671  1,000  935    319,813 
R-squared     0.09  0.16  0.13  0.12    0.29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%               
Notes: Regressions are weighted using survey weights; Errors are clustered at state level. Universe: Unemployed, age 20-65. Source for wage equation: CPS outgoing 
rotation group extract, 2004 and 2005. The CEPR version of the ORG contains hourly wage series that adjust for topcoding and overtime earnings/tips. We exclude 
from the sample self-employed and self-incorporated, full-time and part-time students and employed with hourly earnings of less than $1 or more than $200.     
(1) The base group consists of Job losers. (2) The base group consists of those with a high school degree or less.     
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Table 3. Tobit models for job search time 
Dependent variable: time allocated to job 
search, in min 
Mean 
(Std)  Full sample (1) 
Subsample (2): eligible 
w/o recall expectation 






Mean of dependent variable     32.1  49.1  25.4  23.8 
Adjustment factor for marginal effects     0.153  0.256  0.115  0.110 
Log(maximum weekly benefit amount)  5.89  24.344  -156.8  117.917  169.395 
  (0.220)  (46.807)  (78.173)**  (110.082)  (116.734) 
Fitted log(hourly wage)  2.60  548.212  652.484  801.735  782.099 
  (0.329)  (205.572)***  (315.049)**  (334.230)**  (354.620)** 
Std(residual of wage equation) - by state  0.49  -12.808  380.496  -456.146  -455.813 
  (0.023)  (572.653)  (648.979)  (709.477)  (703.195) 
On temporary layoff w/ recall expectation (1)  0.15  -239.506    (2)  (2) 
    (38.298)***       
Jobleaver  0.03  10.194    98.642   
    (58.054)    (88.601)   
Re- or new entrant  0.38  -80.834    12.685  16.68 
    (24.674)***    (47.770)  (48.193) 
Age  36.75  -24.237  -25.049  -44.41  -45.673 
    (15.895)  (23.579)  (20.642)**  (21.920)** 
Age^2    0.245  0.271  0.421  0.436 
    (0.173)  (0.259)  (0.216)*  (0.229)* 
Some college or associate degree (3)  0.29  -53.855  -77.851  -119.538  -128.672 
    (53.329)  (88.886)  (82.067)  (87.423) 
College degree (BA, MA or PhD)  0.16  -241.132  -269.902  -437.329  -420.545 
    (113.629)**  (188.471)  (189.517)**  (205.614)** 
Female  0.51  87.409  201.337  75.857  65.972 
    (57.036)  (95.916)**  (77.953)  (79.252) 
Female*partner  0.28  -66.344  -88.332  -34.636  -25.595 
    (42.073)  (52.342)*  (73.483)  (79.928) 
Female*children  0.30  -38.338  -111.368  30.277  34.403 
    (59.715)  (81.905)  (69.874)  (70.669) 
Partner  0.50  -4.038  0.006  -14.787  -20.759 
    (37.283)  (46.859)  (66.825)  (70.715) 
Children  0.49  12.663  120.419  -93.485  -96.002 
    (40.987)  (52.645)**  (60.902)  (63.550) 
Weekend  0.28  -218.167  -223.945  -175.855  -172.081 
    (20.653)***  (25.780)***  (31.905)***  (31.877)*** 
Constant    -1062.408  -530.797  -1590.845  -1816.338 
      (332.084)***  (503.571)  (574.960)***  (615.295)*** 
sigma    264.087  230.892  261.18  260.104 
      (15.127)***  (11.709)***  (26.881)***  (31.760)*** 
Year and month dummies     x  x  x  x 
Observations    2,171  671  1,000  935 
Pseudo R-squared     0.04  0.04  0.06  0.05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
Notes: Regressions are weighted using survey weights; Errors are clustered at state level. Universe: Unemployed, age 20-65. Source for wage equation: same as in 
Table 2. 
(1) The base group consists of Job losers. (2) We exclude the dummy for temporary layoff w/ expectation of recall for this regression, because there are only 27 of them 
in the sample of ineligible (part-time workers in states were part-time workers are not eligible for UI) and they all have zero search on the diary day. (3) The base group 





Table 4. Instrumental variables (IV) regressions, marginal effect of log(average weekly benefit) 
Dependent variable: time 
allocated to job search, in min  Full sample (1) 
Subsample (2): 
eligible w/o recall 
expectation & 






Mean of dependent variable  32.1  49.1  25.4  23.8 
OLS             
Log(state average weekly benefit)  12.564  -99.696  50.649  59.639 
  (16.562)  (42.273)**  (24.731)**  (25.850)** 
IV - 2SLS (Instrument: log(maximum weekly benefit amount)) 
Log(state average weekly benefit)  -12.612  -109.74  18.109  36.255 
  (22.504)  (58.433)*  (35.004)  (34.378) 
Tobit             
Log(state average weekly benefit)  20.458  -71.004  41.583  47.419 
  (11.620)*  (34.473)**  (18.008)**  (18.479)** 
IV - Tobit (Instrument: log(maximum weekly benefit amount)) 
Log(state average weekly benefit)  7.909  -77.511  28.312  37.531 
  (13.126)  (39.489)**  (22.004)  (23.097) 
              
Observations  2,171  671  1,000  935 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%          
Notes: Regressions are weighted using survey weights; Errors are clustered at state level. Universe: Unemployed, age 20-65. The average weekly 





Table 5. Linear probability model of job finding 
  Mean        2SLS: 2nd stage  2SLS: 1st stage 
Dependent variable:  (Std)    Job accepted    Job accepted  Job search, in hrs 
Mean of dependent variable    0.16    0.16  3.97 
Job search, in hrs  3.97    0.0031    0.0183   
  (8.49)    (0.0019)*    (0.0066)***   
# of jobsearch methods used  3.33          1.556 
  (1.63)          (0.2786)*** 
Female  0.44    -0.020    0.006  -1.225 
      (0.0290)    (0.0321)  (0.5296)** 
Age  20.20    0.000    -0.002  0.009 
  (1.82)    (0.0092)    (0.0095)  (0.1523) 
Years of school  11.67    0.019    0.022  -0.197 
  (1.60)    (0.0100)*    (0.0107)**  (0.1447) 
Constant      -0.013    0.780  5.609 
        (0.2229)    (0.2146)***  (4.2748) 
Month dummies       x    x  x 
Observations       1,162    1,162  1,162 
R-squared       0.02       0.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: Survey weights are used for the estimates. Universe: Unemployed, age 18-24.   
Source: Authors' calculations and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), 1981.   
 